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IT WAS formerly held in some jurisdictions that an unaccepted check
operated as a pro tanto assignment of the funds on deposit, the payee thereof
having a right of action against a bank which refused payment with adequate
funds of the drawer on hand.- But the Negotiable Instruments Law has
abrogated this rule,2 and it is now generally said that the payee of an un-
accepted check has no rights against th6 drawee bank3 Nevertheless, payees
of checks have repeatedly recovered against drawee banks where the crr-
cumstances were substantially as follows: A dealer engaged in purchasing
livestock, poultry, or grain from farmers and reselling the commodities to
commission houses lacks funds with which to conduct his business. He there-
fore enters into an agreement 4 with a bank, whereby the bank promises to
honor any checks he draws upon it in paying for purchases made in the
course of business, and he either agrees to deposit with it the proceeds de-
rived from reselling the goods involved, or to deliver to the bank a draft
therefor on his consignee, sometimes to be accompanied by a bill of lading.
Ordinarily the checks are to be paid after the bank has received the resale
proceeds or draft, although occasionally the bank agrees to pay them on
presentation whether or not it has received either. Pursuant to this agree-
ment the dealer makes purchases, paying by check, on which he sometimes
indicates the merchandise involved, sells the goods, and either deposits the
proceeds or delivers a draft on the consignee. At some point in the history
of this arrangement, a payee farmer or ranchman presents a check given
him by the dealer in payment for the goods shipped, or for a part thereof,
but the bank, although aware of the origin of the check, claims the right
to apply whatever proceeds it has on hand to outstanding debts due it from
I. Note, L R. A. 1916 C 164, 169; BnAwNAN, NEoTr ~u INsTnuMu:zs LAw
(5th ed. 1932) 1073; 5 Micnm, BAWRs AND BANXunm (Perm. ed. 1932) 366; see 2
MoRsE, BA xs AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 491 ct seq.
2. Section 189 provides: "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of
any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not
liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check."
3. South Carolina Nat. Bank v. 'McCandless, 44 F. (2d) III (C. C. A. 4th, 1930);
Brantley v. Collie, 205 N. C. 229, 171 S. E. 88 (1933) ; BnAnr, BAur, Cnscns (2d ed.
1926) 17; 5 MicHIE, op. cit. supra note 1, 373-377; see Aigler, Rights of Holder of.Bill
of Exchange Against the Drawee (1925) 3S HAErV. L. REv. 857.
4. Occasionally the agreement is implied by virtue of a continued course of dealing
between the bank and its customer. Pierceville State Bank v. Gray County Bank, 113
Kan. 352, 214 Pac. 788 (1923) ; Singer v. Citizens' Bank of Headrick, 79 Okla. 267, 193
Pac. 41 (1920); Webster v. First State Bank of Peever, 46 S. D. 460, 193 N. N. 675
(1923), 50 S. D. 159, 208 N. NV. 774 (1926).
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the dealer, asserts that the dealer's credit balance is inadequate, and refuses
payment. Thereupon it is sued by the payee for the face value of the check.6
The courts have justified recovery in such situations by several theories.
Most frequently relief has been granted on the ground that the payee is a
third party beneficiary of the agreement described. 6 This reasoning should
require a preliminary analysis of the bargain between the dealer and the bank
in order to determine whether the bank has broken its promis. The bank
may have promised to honor the dealer's chdcks only after it has received
the resale proceeds of the goods for N~hich those particular checks were given.
Such an agreement might be one to pay the dealer's subsequent overdrafts
arising out of the particular transaction, the consideration for the future credit
extension being the dealer's promise to deposit the proceeds from future
resales 7 and in some cases to pay interest; 8 or it might be one merely to
5. For cases where recovery was allowed, see notes 6, 17, 22, 39, infra; cf. Union
Stockyards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411 (1890); Steere v. Stockyards National
Bank, 113 Tex. 387, 256 S. W. 586 (1923), 258 S. W. 1042 (1924). Contra: Andrew
v. Waterville Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 888, 219 N. W. 53 (1928); cf. Brantley v. Collie,
205 N. C. 229, 171 S. E. 88 (1933); In re Security Savings Bank, 211 N. W. 233 (Iowa
1927) ; Bank of Magazine v. Friddle, 179 Ark. 53, 14 S. W. (2d) 238 (1929) ; Citizens'
Bank of Gans v. Mabray, 90 Okla. 63, 215 Pac. 1067 (1923); Ward Commission Co. v.
Sioux Falls National Bank, 199 Iowa 829, 202 N. W. 829 (1925) (compare with Gillespie
case, supra).
6. Chanute National Bank v. Crowell, 6 Kan. App. 533, 51 Pac. 575 (1897);
Bank of Garnett v. Cramer, 7 Kan. App. 461, 53 Pac. 534 (1898); Ballard v. Home
National Bank of Arkansas City, 91 Kan. 91, 136 Pac. 935 (1913); Saylors v. State
Bank of Allen, 99 Kan. 515, 100 Kan. 64, 163 Pac. 454 (1917); Goeken v. Bank of
Palmer, 100 Kan. 177, 163 Pac. 636 (1917), 104 Kan. 370, 179 Pac. 321 (1919) ;
Humpert v. Citizens' State Bank of Talmadge, 122 Kan. 101, 250 Pac. 1077 (1926);
Singer v. Citizens' Bank of Headrick, 79 Okla. 267, 193 Pac. 41 (1920); Webster v.
First State Bank of Peever, 46 S. D. 460, 193 n\ W. 675. (1923), 50 S. D. 159, 208
N. W. 774 (1926); Pascoe v. Franklin County State Bank, 217 Iowa 205, 251 N. W.
63 (1933) senible; Scoby v. Bird State Bank, 112 Kan. 135, 211 Pac. 110 (1922) semble;
see Northcraft v. Home State Bank, 120 Kan. 572, 575, 245 Pac. 114, 115 (1926); cf.
Manget v. National City Bank, 168 Ga. 876, 149 S. E. 213 (1929) ("Where the promise
of benefit to the third person creates a trust in his favor, he may enforce.the trust in a
court of equity"). See 2 WILusTON, CoNrTAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 389.
Usually the plaintiff is unaware of the agreement and the courts generally hqld that
he need not have knowledge thereof to recover as a third party beneficiary. See cases
cited srupra. But cf. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Pettit & Smith, 41 111. 492 (1866) ;
Nelson v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 Ill. 36 (1868) ; Citizens' Bank of Gans v.
Mabray, 90 Okla. 63, 215 Pac. 1067 (1923) ; Brown v. Mutual Trust Co., 267 Pa. 523,
110 Atl. 155 (1920).
7. The receipt of a deposit was held sufficient consideration for a promise to extend
a $10,000 line of credit in Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust
Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S. W. 92 (1916); see Merchants Bank & Trust Co. of Canada
v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106, 114, 209 Pac. 1113, 1116 (1902) (that business to be transacted
with appellant bank constitutes consideration). But of. Swindell & Co. v. First National
Bank, 121 Ga. 714, 49 S. E..673 (1905).
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honor the checks if a sufficient balance remained after all the bank's matured
claims against the dealer had been satisfied.9 In either case, the bank's re-
fusal to honor the plaintiff's check before receipt of the proceeds, or to honor
checks arising out of other transactions, would not constitute a breach of
its contract; nor in the latter case, would a breach result from a refusal to
honor checks even after the receipt of the proceeds provided that the dealer's
credit balance was inadequate. On the other hand, the bank's promise may
be one to honor the dealer's overdrafts from the inception of the agreement
in return for the dealer's promise to deposit the resale proceeds. Two con-
structions would then be possible as to the period during which credit was
to be extended. Such a promise might be interpreted as one to pay over-
drafts during each interval between the purchase of commodities in a particular
transaction and the receipt df the resale proceeds therefrom. In that case,
the refusal to honor checks presented after the receipt of proceeds from one
shipment and before the inception of another transaction would not con-
stitute a breach unless the dealer's credit balance were sufficient Or the
promise might be one to pay all overdrafts made in the ordinary course of
business for a reasonable time regardless of whether the checks were pre-
sented before or after the receipt of the resale proceeds from any particular
transaction. The refusal to honor any business check would then be a
breach of the bank's promise. It is sometimes difficult fo determine from
the reported decisions the precise terms of the agreement involved;10 perhaps
the parties themselves may have failed to make this explicit; nor is the
practice so general that business usage points unmistakably to one inter-
pretation or another. Generally, however, the courts seem to have concluded
that an overdraft agreement arose whereby the bank was to pay the dealer's
checks and the dealer to deposit the resale proceeds, the bank being bound
8. The opinions do not ordinarily disclose the amount of interest, if any, to be paid.
However, 8 per cent interest was provided for in Saylors v. State Bank of Allen, 99
Kan. 515, 163 Pac. 454 (1917), and the "regular rate" in Bank of Garnett v. Cramer,
7 Kan. App. 461, 53 Pac. 534 (189S). In the majority of the cases the bank's extension
of credit was apparently unsecured. But in the Bank of Ganelt case, stipra, the bank
received a bond, signed by the dealer and two sureties, guaranteeing that the dealer's
overdrafts would be repaid on demand. Cf. Gillen v. Wakefield State Bank, 246 Mich.
158, 224 N. NV. 761 (1929) (agreements in writing in the form of signed notes with no
sum fixed endorsed by dealer to bank to cover overdrafts); Dolan v. Danbury State
Bank, 207 Iowa 597, 223 N.-XV. 400 (1929) (attempted overdraft agreement limited to
$1500, bank being secured by three $500 notes).
9. In this view of the bargain, the only deviation from the conventional bank-deposit-
or relationship resulting from the agreement is that the bank understands that the dealer
will issue checks before he has deposited the funds to meet them.
10. The bank's agreement may also be to apply the proceeds of each shipment to
those checks given for the particular merchandise comprising the shipment. If so, the
payee might recover on the ground that a deposit for a specific purpose arose and the
third party beneficiary doctrine is unnecessary. See page 487 infra.
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regardless of whether those proceeds proved sufficient, so that the bank
breached its promise when it dishonored the plaintiff's check."'
But even if a breach has occurred, there are doctrinal objections to allow-
ing the plaintiff relief as a third party beneficiary 12 Although it is uniformly
recognized that a bank promises all its checking account depositors to pay
their checks to the amount of their deposits, 3 payees suing as third party
beneficiaries of this promise have been denied recovery primarily on the
ground that a contrary result would subject banks to double liability and so
nullify the effect of the rule that a check is not an assignment.1 4 Recognizing
this, .the courts have attempted to distinguish the cases under discussion on
the theory that these actions were not based simply on the "check alone"
or the usual promise of a bank to a drawer, but upon the "entire transaction"
between them.in The distinction hardly seems persuasive. Despite the "entire
transaction," the promise of the bank to the drawer remains essentially the
same type of promise that exists in the conventional bank-depositor relation-
11. In Saylors v. State Bank of Allen, 99 Kan. 515, 100 Kan. 64, 163 Pac. 454 (1917),
whether the bank had promised to pay the dealer's checks only up to the amount of the
resale proceeds or had agreed to pay the dealer's overdrafts was held to be a question
for the jury. Cf. Northcraft v. Home State Bank, 120 Kan. 572, 575, 245 Pac. 114,
115 (1926).
12. Occasionally the banks have unsuccessfully attempted to defend on the ground
that the alleged overdraft agreement was ltra vires and void. Saylors v. State Bank
of Allen, 99 Kan. 515, 100 Kan. 64, 163 Pac. 454 (1917) (admitting overdraft agree-
ments disfavored, but declaring them legal); Humpert v. Citizens' State Bank of Tal-
madge, 122 Kan. 101, 250 Pac. 1077 (1926) (defense unavailable when "arrangement
. . . so far . . . carried out"); see BRADY, BANC CHEcs (2d ed. 1926) 411, note
11. Contra: S. R. & P. Import Co. v. American Union Bank, 122 Misc. 798, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 755 (Sup. Ct., 1924) (overdraft agreement contrary to public policy and void).
13. 5 MiCHm, op. cit. supra note 1, 375, 423, note 46; 2 MoRsE, op. cit. supra note
1, § 458. For a comprehensive analysis of the agreement ordinarily entered into by a
bank and a depositor at the inception of a checking account, see Moore, Sussman & Brand,
Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks, I: Legal
Methods (1933) 42 YA.n L. J. 817.
14. If recovery is allowed, the bank is of course liable to suit both by the payee
and drawer. Cf. Dolan v. Danbury State Bank, 207 Iowa 597, 223 N. W. 400 (1929).
This possibility was held to bar recovery on the third party beneficiary theory prior to
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R. R. v.
Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 42 N.E. 700 (1896); Carr v. National Security Bank, 107 Mass.
45 (1871) (saying also that there was no privity of contract); Bank of the Republic
v. Millard, 10 lrall. 152 (U. S. 1869) semble. Today, recognition of payees as
beneficiaries would similarly avoid the purpose of Section 189 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, supra note 2. That the purpose of that section is to safeguard banks against
the risk of double liability, see Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W. Va. 12,
19, 150 S. E. 137, 139 (1929) ; Elgin v. Gross-Kelly & Co., 20 N. M. 450, 464, 150 Pac. 922,
925 (1915) ; Hove v. Stanhope State Bank, 138 Iowa 39, 43, 115 N. W. 476, 487 (1908);
5 M cH E, op. cit. supra note 1, 371.
15. See, e.g., Ballard v. Home National Bank of Arkansas City, 91 Kan. 91, 96, 136
Pac. 935, 936 (1913).
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ship, namely, one to pay his checks. 10 No greater intent to benefit the payee
exists in one case than in the other, and to allow recovery in the instant type
of situation results in double, liability which is just as much a nullification
of the Negotiable Instruments Law as it would be in the ordinary case.
A second theory on which recovery has been allowed is that the deposit
of the proceeds was special or specific rather than general.17 While a survey
of the cases reveals no single clearly defined test, a deposit is usually said
to be special or specific if the bank promises that it will be used only for
a designated purpose.'3  In the situation under consideration, if the bank
promises that the resale proceeds from a particular transaction will be used
only to pay the checks given in that transaction, including the payee's, thus
satisfying the foregoing definition of special or specific deposits, there is
substantial authority that the payee is entitled to recover 0 But such a con-
struction would seem improper in the usual case. First, there is a presump-
tion in favor of a general deposit.20 But more important, the mere fact that
the agreement contemplates a continuing relationship suggests that the parties
intended the bank to be free to apply deposits to previous obligations of the
16. Cf. Brown v. Mutual Trust Co., 267 Pa. 523, 110 At. 155 (1920); First Nat.
Bank of Chicago v. Pettit & Smith, 41 Ill. 492 (1866) ; see Continental Bank and Trust
Co. v. Hartman, 129 S. W. 179, 180 (Te:. 1910).
17. Ballard v. Home National Bank of Arkansas City, 91 Kan. 91, 136 Pac. 935
(1913) ; Moravek v. First National Bank of Jewell City, 119 Kan. 84, 237 Pac. 921
(1925) ; Morton v. Woolery, 48 N. D. 1132, 189 N. V. 232 (1922); Payne Bros. v.
Burnett, 151 Tenn. 496, 269 S. V. 27 (1925) semble (holding funds "impressed with a
trust"); see Wilson v. Dawson, 52 Ind. 513, 515 (1876) ; cf. Afanget v. National City
Bank, 168 Ga. 876, 883, 149 S. E. 213, 217 (1929); Houck v. Bank of Newport, 150
Ore. 295, 303, 43 P. (2d) 179, 182 (1935); German National Bank v. Grinstead, 26
Ky. L. Rep. 674, 52 S.W. 951 (1899) ; Parkersburg Mill Co. v. Farmers' and Traders'
National Bank, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 964, 82 S. NV. 1003 (1904). Contra! Andrew v. Water-
vile Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 838, 219 N. ,V. 53 (1928); cf. In re Security Savings
Bank of Perry, 211 N.W. 233 (Iowa 1927).
18. Straus v. Tradesmen's National Bank, 122 N. Y. 379, 25 N.F_. 372 (IS90);
Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Merchants' Bank and Trust Co., 193 N. C.
696, 138 S. F_. 22 (1927) ; Decatur Creamery v. West Side Trust and Savings Bank, 213
Ill. App. 220 (1919); see Notes (1924) 24 A.L R. 1111, (1925) 39 A.L.R. 1138,
(1933) 86 A. L. IL 375; 5 Mxcrnm, op. cit. supra note 1, 635 et scq.; 1 Monsr, op. Cit.
supra note 1, § 185; 2 MoasE, op. cit. utpra note 1, § 567.
The courts frequently use the terms special and specific interchangeably. That there
is a distinction, see Collins v. Morgan County Nat. Bank, 226.Ala. 376, 147 So. 161
(1933) ; Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Merchants' Bank and Trust Co.,
193 N. C. 696, 699, 133 S. E. 22, 24 (1927) ; see Comment (1935) 8 So. CAtv. L. Rmv.
122. Strictly speaking, a special deposit arises only when the identical thing deposited
is to be returned to the depositor. See 1 MoasE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 183; 5 Mrcnmn
op. cit. supra note 1, 626, note 10; fd. (Supp. 1936) 626, note 10. A specific deposit
might be more accurately described as a general deposit for a specific purpose.
19. See cases cited note 18, supra.
20. 1 MoasF, op. cit. smpra note 1, § 186; 5 Mxictar, op. cit. .tpra note 1, 25.
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dealer arising from his business operations. 21 And force is lent to the sug-
gestion when it is considered that if the dealer made several shipments at
approximately the same time, giving rise to several deposits, the bank might
have considerable difficulty in determining which deposit was to be applied
to any particular check presented for payment. Accordingly, even if the
resale proceeds are to be deposited before the checks are to be paid, it is
probably more accurate to describe the bank's promise as one to honor the
checks on condition that the proceeds are deposited, not as one to devote
those particular proceeds to the payment of particular checks.
A third theory on which recovery has been allowed is that the bank, aware
of the dealer's method of operation, has knowingly acquired money belonging
to the payee and so must pay it over.to him on demand.2 2 The basis for ihis
conclusion is the rule that when a check is given in payment in a cash sale,
title to the goods remains in the seller until the check is paid,.notwithstanding
delivery of the goods to the buyer, unless there is affirmative evidence that
the seller intended to accept the check as absolute payment; and that there-
fore if the vendor does not waive the condition of cash payment by failing
to act with reasonable promptness, he may recover the goods or the proceeds
thereof from subsequent purchasers, in many cases even though they are
innocent,2 3 or from creditors of the vendee.24 It should be observed that this
21. For a detailed discussion of the character of the deposit in these cases, see
Andrew v. Waterville Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 888, 219 N. W. 53 (1928).
Where the circumstances are otherwise analogous, but the arrangement only temporary,
there is more justification for holding the deposit to be special or specific. See First
National Bank v. Barger, 115 S. W. 726 (Ky. 1909), and Falls City State Bank v.
Wehrli, 68 Neb. 75, 93 N.W. 994 (1903), both of which arose in jurisdictions then
recognizing a check as a pro tanto assignment.
22. Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 116 Mo.
558, 22 S. W. 813 (1893) ; York v. Farmers' Bank, 105 Mo. App. 127, 79 S. W. 968 (1904)
(constructive trust held to arise) ; Pile v. Bank of Flemington, '187 Mo. App. 61, 173
S.W. 50 (1914) ; Ballard Y. First National Bank of Bolivar, 195 S.W. 559 (Mo. 1917) ;
Armstrong v. First National Bank of Boliver, 195 S. W. 562 (Mo. 1917) ; State ex rel.
Roberts v. Trimble, 316 Mo. 354, 289 S.W. 796 (1926) ; First National Bank of Little-
field v. Neel, 10 S. W. (2d) 408 (Tex. 1928) ; Thomas v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Ludlow,
217 S. W. 860 (Mo. 1920), 236 S. W. 376 (Mo. 1922). Accord: Canadian Bank v. McCrea,
106 Ill. 281 (1882) ; People's State Bank of Michigan Valley v. Brown, 80 Kan. 520, 103
Pac. 102 (1909); Chadd v. Byers State Bank, 111 Kan. 279, 206 Pac. 880 (1922);
Crocker State Bank v. White, 226 S. W. 972 (Mo. 1920); First National Bank of
Byars v. Griffin & Griffin, 31- Okla. 382, 120 Pac. 595 (1912); Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Hartman, 129 S. W. 179 (Tex. 1910); see Manget v. National.City Bank, 168
Ga. 876, 882, 149 S. E. 213, 216 (1929) (statute mentioned is only declarative of com-
mon law rule; see note 23, infra); cf. Wright v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 144 Mo.
App. "640, 129 S.W. 407 (1910); Lewis v. James McMahon & Co., 307 Mo. 552, 271
S. W. 779 (1925). But cf. Perry v. Bank of Smithfield, 131 N. C. 117, 42 S. E. 551
(1902).
23. If the defendant is not a bon . fide purchaser for value, the vendor universally
prevails. Harbert v. Ft. Smith Canning Company, 134 Kan. 240, 5-P. (2d) 849 (1931);
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theory makes the plaintiff's right depend neither on the bank's promise to
the dealer25 nor on the fact that the plaintiff is the payee or holder of a
check wrongfully dishonored by the defendant.2- In this view, the plaintiff
might recover against the depositee bank even if the check he received in
payment were drawn on and dishonored by a different bank.
Where recovery is allowed on this theory, the courts frequently engage in
a discussion of whether the bank had notice of the payee's rights, much as
they do in actions brought against a purchaser of the goods where they are
confronted with the split of authority27 as to whether recovery can be had
against an innocent purchaser. The bank is usually charged with such notice,
apparently on the ground that it knew that the dealer had paid the plaintiff
for the merchandise in question by check. But it seems doubtful if this knowl-
edge alone should be sufficient, since it can well be argued that in order to
charge the bank with notice that title to the goods did not pass, the evidence
Mott v. Nelson, 96 Okla. 117, 220 Pac. 617 (1923); see Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R.
578, (1928) 54 A. L. R. 526 (concluding that the rule etends no further). But there
is authority that the doctrine may be invoked even as against innocent subvendees.
National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 44 Minm. 224, 46 N. WV 342
(1890); Barksdale x. Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921); Clark v. Hamilton
Diamond Company, 209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930) ; Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24,
102 Pac. 799 (1909), 110 Pac. 398 (1910) ; see 1 ,ViLmsmTn, SATEs (2d ed. 1924) 822;
VOLn, SALEs (1931) 174.
In Georgia the rule is statutory as to the sale of certain agricultural products by
planters or commission houses. GA. CoDE (1933) §§20-1004, 96-110.
24. South San Francisco Packing and Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190
Pac. 628 (1920); People's State Bank of Michigan Valley v. Brown, 80 K-A. 520, 103
Pac. 102 (1909) ; Wright v. 'Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 144 Mo. App. 640, 129 S. AV.
407 (1910); Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 368, 179 At. 279
(1935); Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Hartman, 129 S. NV. 179 (Ter- 1910) ; see
Note (1907) 13 L.R.A. (x. s.) 697, 705. The vendor has been consistently allowed
recovery against the purchaser's trustee in bankruptcy. In re Tracy, 185 Fed. 844
(S. D. N. Y. 1911) ; In re Perpall, 256 Fed. 758 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) ; Marion Machine
Foundry and Supply Co. v. Girand, 285 Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) ; In re Broomhall,
ilIough & Co., 47 F. (2d) 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Manufacturers Finance Co. ,.
Armstrong, 78 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; see CoL iER, BANK-Ruprcy (3d ed. 1934)
1222; BLACk, BANxRuPTCY (2d ed. 1930) 466.
25. See State ex rel. Scott v. Trimble, 289 S. IV. 796, 802 (Mo. 1926). In John S.
Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 154 Tenn. 689, 290 S. NV. 994 (1927), the payee recovered
although there apparently was no unconventional agreement between the dealer and
the bank.
Since the bank may also be liable to the drawer, this theory in fact renders it doubly
liable. It can be argued, however, that this does not conflict with the purpose of § 1S9
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, because liability to the payee is in no way predicated
on the ground that the bank wrongfully dishonored the check.
26. It would seem'logical that a bank in such a case would be obliged to ignore a
stop-payment order by the drawer. Cf. Moravek v. First Nat. Bank of Jewell City, 119
Kan. 84, 88, 237 Pac. 921, 923 (1925).
27. Note 23, mtpra.
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should warrant a finding that the bank knew not only that payment was
to be made by check, but also that the parties contemplated a cash sale. 8
Another view of the bank's position would often enable the courts to dispense
entirely with the troublesome problem"8 of notice. In the cases under dis-
cussion, the bank's status seems to be either that of an unsecured or a secured
creditor of the dealer rather than a purchaser of the goods. The bank would
clearly be an unsecured creditor of the dealer where it merely received the
resale proceeds or a draft therefor without a bill of lading 30 and although
where the bank discounts a draft and takes a bill of lading, the nature of its
interest is not entirely dear, the parties probably intend it to have merely
a security interest and not complete ownership.31 At least when the bank is
an unsecured creditor, its knowledge of the transaction between the payee
and the dealer apparently should be unimportant, since in actions by the
vendor against other types of unsecured creditors of the vendee, the question
of notice is ignored by the courts, 32 the vendor recovering simply on the
ground that the creditor can acquire no greater interest than his debtor. 33
Notice might be considered important, however, in the case of secured
creditors, where it would be easier to argue that the creditor had relied on
the vendee's apparent ownership of the specific goods.34
28. See VOLD, SALES (1931) 176; Perry v. Bank of Smithfield, 131 N. C. 117, 120,
42 S. E. 551, 552 (1902); cf. First National Bank of Chicago v. Pettit & Smith, 41
Ill. 492 (1866); 5 MIcHIE, op. cit. supra note 1, 379 ("The knowledge on the part of
a bank that checks have been drawn does not render it obligatory on the part of a bank
to retain the deposit to meet them").
29. In Thomas v. Farmers' National Bank of Ludlow, 217 S. W. 860 (Mfo. 1920),
236 S. W. 376 (Mo. 1922), the question of notice was still unsettled after two trials.
30. Where it discounts the draft, however, the bank might be said to be a pur-
chaser of the paper. See Notes (1921) 11 A. L. R. 1046, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 727,
(1935) 99 A. L. R. 488; 5 MiciE, op. cit. siupra note 1, 59 et seq.; 2 MoRsE, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 586. For a valuable discussion of the problems involved, concluding that
such a description of the bank's status is inaccurate, see Turner, Deposits of Demand
Paper as "Purchases" (1928) 37 YAtx L. J. 874.
31. Leonhardt & Co. v. Small & Co., 117 Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. 1051 (1906); see
Comment (1926) 26 COL. L. Ray. 63. But cf. Weed v. Boston & Maine R. R., 124 Me.
336, 128 AtI. 696 (1925) (holding that the seller could not maintain an action against
the railroad for the loss of the goods shipped because the bank had title to the goods).
32. See cases cited note 24, supra.
33. See South San Francisco Packing and Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131,
136, 190 Pac. 628, 630 (1920).
34. Where the original vendor has been denied recovery against innocent subvendees,
the theory ordinarily invoked is that the subvendee had a right to rely on his immediate
vendor's apparent ownership. See cases cited note 23, supra. The same argument might
be advanced in favor of an innocent creditor who had relied on his debtor's apparent
ownership. Reliance could easily be shown in the case of secured creditors. Cf. (1935)
35 CoL. L. Ra,. 1305. But cf. Federal Bldg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N. E. 163
(Ind., 1936).
It has been suggested that the vendor in a conditional sale may be estopped
to recover against the creditors of his vendee. See 1 WILLIsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924)
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But even if the question of notice is considered immaterial, this explanation
of the cases is vulnerable to attack. The underlying rule that in a cash sale
title remains in the seller until the check is paid has been sharply assailed on
the ground that an unreserved conveyance of dominion over the goods by
the vendor justifies a conclusion that he intends to pass title.m This would
seem particularly cogent in the instant circumstances where the vendor must -
usually realize that the vendee is purchasing only for immediate resale.as
The somewhat extraordinary group of cases under discussion are of two-
fold significance. In the first place, they indicate that the disfavored over-
draft agreement is not so rare an occurrence in'American banking as is
sometimes supposed. 7 In addition, they represent a class of cases in which
th6 courts have consistently evaded Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law and have imposed on the bknk a duty similar to that which it would
owe to the seller of goods who had relied on a commercial letter of credit
issued by the bank in favor of the buyer.3s The uniformity with which re-
§ 326. But apparently something more than mere possession of the goods by the vendee
is necessary, such as an authorization to resell, or the vendee's possession of some indicia
of title. See WII.LisToN, . ipra § 329.
35. See King v. Adams, 265 Fed. 9, 11 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Johnson-Brinkman
Commission Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 116 Mo. 558, 572, 22 S.W. 813, 816
(1893) ; Goodwin v. Bear, 122 Wash. 49, 51, 209 Pac. 10SO (1922) ; 1 Wxr.usrol, SAMES
(2d. ed. 1924) §§346a, 346b; VoLD, SALEs (1931) 175.
36. In Parma v. First National Bank of Cameron, 37 S. NV. (2d) 274, 276 (Te.
1931), it was stated that such action on the part of the seller conclusively indicated an
'intent to pass title and so resulted in a waiver of his right to reclaim the property from
innocent subvendees; cf. First National Bank of Chicago v. Pettit & Smith, 41 Ill. 492
(1866). But cf. Ballard v. First National Bank of Bolivar, 195 S. IV. 559, 561
(Mo. 1917).
37. That unsecured commercial overdraft arrangements are unusual in the United
States, see fooRE, Com=RcrAL BAX CREorr I (unpublished manuscript, Yale Law
Library 1936) 64; TrAw, BAim ADUMNSTRATIONT (1931) 216. That they are generally
frowned upon in this country as an unwise banking practice, see WVEsTEBnmm, BAMI=n
PxuxcizpLs Aim PRACTICE (Rev. Edition 1928) 582; Ammurcn z IusTn g= or BAz-rl-N,
BAx=G Fu sNsT.s (1925) 83. But cf. 2 WAnunG, Fmma. R~svE SYsTrL.
(1930) 469. They are, however, a familiar practice in England. See U.S. Bunra u or
FOREIGz" Aim DomEsTic Coamuc E, THE UNrrmo KniGDou (1930) 672-674; Srrumn,
MfoNEY mm BANmKIG (1933)-209; Moons, stpra, at 65-103. Insofar as can be discerned
from the reported opinions the arrangements in the principal cases seem distinguishable
from the normal English type in that they are apparently "requirement contracts" not
limited to a definite maximum figure.
38. Cf. Nelson v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 Ill. 36 (186S). For cares in-
volving actual documentary letters of credit, see American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat.
Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), 277 Fed. 1016 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), cert. den.,
258 U.S. 617 (1922) ; De Sousa v. Crocker First Nat Bank of San Francisco, 23 F.
(2d) 118 (N. D. Cal. 1927) ; Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 57. See generally, Mead, Nature
of Rights and Obligations Created by Documentary Letters of Credit in Wmm, AzsuncAr
ComnmcAL CRnmrs (1922) 247 et seq.; FNrjmu sT , LEGAL Asrzcrs oF CommnsaAt
19371
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46: 483
covery has been allowed, and the variety of rationalizations which have been
employed,3 9 suggest that the courts have been motivated by considerations
which the opinions do not ordinarily reveal. The courts may feel that the
bank, by sanctioning this method of maintaining a checking account, has
encouraged the dealer to. issue checks before depositing funds with which
to meet them, and is therefore to some extent responsible for the payee's
predicament, 'which is normally complicated by the dealer's insolvency
40
Furthermore, perhaps of even greater influence may be the fact that the
plaintiff is ordinarily the original producer of the commodity involved, and
a bias in his favor is part of a familiar social attitude.41
LzrrEs OF CREDIT (1930) 150 et seq.; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit (1922)
35 HARv. L. REV. 539, 563; McCurdy, The Right.of the Beneficiary inder a Commercial
Letter of Credit (1924) 37 HAIW. L. REv. 323. That a letier of credit may be general,
see American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat. Bank, supra, at 43; Finkelstein, siupra, at 94.
The most favored theory on which recovery is allowed the seller under a commercial
letter of credit is that a direct contract arises between him and the bank, the considera-
tion moving from the buyer. See Mead, supra, at 251; McCurdy, sapra, 37 HAarv. L.
REv. at 337.
39. Fraud has occasionally been invoked as a basis for relief. Gillen v. Wakefield
State Bank, 246 Mich. 158, 224 N. W. 761 (1929); cf. Singer v. Citizen!' Bank of
Headrick, 79 Okla. 267, 269, 193 Pac. 41, 43 (1920).
Where the circumstances were somewhat analogous, the courts have sometimes used
other rationales. Thus, it has been held that although anl unaccepted check of itself
is not an assignment, its issuance coupled with other facts might create one. Conn v.
San Antonio National Bank, 249 S. W. 1045 (Tex. 1923) ("assignment pro tanto"
held to result from .bank telegram "good today") ; Guaranty State Bank v. Sumner,
278 S. W. 459 (Tex. 1925) (bank's oral assurance to cattle vendor that check would be
paid worked an assignment); cf. People's Nat. Bank v. Swift, 134 Tenn. 175, 183 S. W.
725 (1916) (delay in returning check to payee held to be acceptance under § 137 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law). But cf. Bank of Magazine v. Friddle, 179 Ark. 53, 14
S. W. (2d) 238 (1929).
An equitable assignment has been held to result where the drawee is aware that the
drawer has designated to the payee the funds from which the check would be paid.
Boyle v. Vivian State Bank, 55 S. D. 441, 226 N. W. 579 (1929) ; First National Bank
v. Rogers-Amundson-Flynn Co., 151 Minn. 243, 186 N. W. 575 (1922) (suit by bank
against dealer's consignee); cf. Nelson v. Conroy Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 391, 194 N. W.
204 (1923). These cases rest ultimately on language employed in Fourth Street Bank
v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, at 644 (1896).
For a discussion of the possibility that special circumstances may create a con-
structive acceptance by estoppel, see Feezer, Acceptance of Bills of Exchange by Condtct
(1927) 12 MInNx. L. Rza. 129. See generally, AIGLER, supra note 3, at 862, Comment
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 626; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 744; (1930) 8 N. C. L. REV. 201; 2
WmLsxoN, CoNTRacrs (Rev. ed. 1936) §§425, 426.
40. See Pascoe v. Franklin County State Bank, 217 Iowa 205, 211, 251 N. W. 63, 66
(1933). Cf. Gillen v. Wakefield State Bank, 246 Mich. 158, 224 X. W. 761 (1929).
41. In Georgia special statutory protection is accorded planters and their com-
mission houses. See note 23, supro.
